continuous-learning-v2
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 20, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
hooks/observe.shscript is vulnerable to Python code injection. It processes tool outputs by interpolating raw shell variables into a Python string literal ('''$INPUT_JSON'''). Malicious tool output containing triple quotes can break out of the literal and execute arbitrary code whenever the hook runs. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The system implements a pipeline where imported instincts from arbitrary URLs or auto-generated instincts from logs are 'evolved' into persistent executable commands, skills, or agents. This allows untrusted content to gain execution rights in the agent environment.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
/instinct-importcommand inscripts/instinct-cli.pyallows fetching content from arbitrary, unverified URLs usingurllib.request.urlopenand saving it to the local filesystem. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The system captures and logs the full inputs and outputs of all tool calls (including
Read,Edit, andBash) to~/.claude/homunculus/observations.jsonl. This log contains sensitive session data and can be exported via the/instinct-exportcommand. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection. Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters via tool outputs stored in
observations.jsonl. Boundary markers: No delimiters or warnings are used. Capability inventory: The evolution process can write new executable files. Sanitization: No validation or sanitization is performed on tool outputs before analysis.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata