continuous-learning-v2

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 20, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The hooks/observe.sh script is vulnerable to Python code injection. It processes tool outputs by interpolating raw shell variables into a Python string literal ('''$INPUT_JSON'''). Malicious tool output containing triple quotes can break out of the literal and execute arbitrary code whenever the hook runs.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The system implements a pipeline where imported instincts from arbitrary URLs or auto-generated instincts from logs are 'evolved' into persistent executable commands, skills, or agents. This allows untrusted content to gain execution rights in the agent environment.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The /instinct-import command in scripts/instinct-cli.py allows fetching content from arbitrary, unverified URLs using urllib.request.urlopen and saving it to the local filesystem.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The system captures and logs the full inputs and outputs of all tool calls (including Read, Edit, and Bash) to ~/.claude/homunculus/observations.jsonl. This log contains sensitive session data and can be exported via the /instinct-export command.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection. Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters via tool outputs stored in observations.jsonl. Boundary markers: No delimiters or warnings are used. Capability inventory: The evolution process can write new executable files. Sanitization: No validation or sanitization is performed on tool outputs before analysis.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Mar 20, 2026, 01:18 PM