skills/jonmumm/skills/ralph-tdd/Gen Agent Trust Hub

ralph-tdd

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 1, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The orchestration script scripts/ralph-tdd.sh executes the AI agent (Claude or Codex) using flags that explicitly disable all security and permission prompts (--dangerously-skip-permissions for Claude Code and --dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox for Codex). This configuration enables the agent to execute any arbitrary shell command on the host system autonomously.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation encourages the installation of external AI skills from third-party sources (e.g., npx skills add mattpocock/skills@tdd), which introduces unverified code into the development environment.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is highly vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it incorporates external, untrusted data into a high-privilege autonomous loop.
  • Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to read from .ralph/progress.md, .ralph/lessons.md, and external backlog sources such as Linear teams, GitHub issues, or local PRD files.
  • Boundary markers: The system prompt in scripts/ralph-tdd.sh does not use delimiters or instructions to isolate untrusted backlog data from the agent's core instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has unrestricted shell access and filesystem permissions due to the 'full-auto' flags used in the script.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the content retrieved from the backlog sources before it is processed by the agent.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Mar 1, 2026, 12:56 AM