gemini-tavily-search

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 27, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The script scripts/tavily_search.sh executes npx -y mcp-remote to facilitate the OAuth flow or connect to Tavily's MCP server. This command downloads and executes a package from the npm registry at runtime without version pinning.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses sensitive local files in the ~/.mcp-auth directory. The scripts/tavily_search.sh script searches for *_tokens.json files and reads access_token values to authenticate requests to the Tavily API. While intended for its core functionality, this involves accessing credential stores in the user's home directory.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires the execution of shell scripts and suggests using sudo in its README.md for the installation of system dependencies like curl and jq.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection due to its processing of untrusted external web content.
  • Ingestion points: Search results and snippets are retrieved from external providers (Google and Tavily) and injected into the agent's context in scripts/gemini_tavily_search.sh and scripts/tavily_search.sh.
  • Boundary markers: The skill returns data as JSON but does not provide specific instructions or delimiters to the LLM to ignore potentially malicious instructions embedded within the snippets.
  • Capability inventory: The skill is capable of performing network requests via curl and executing shell commands through its distributed scripts.
  • Sanitization: The implementation does not perform sanitization, filtering, or escaping of the fetched search results before returning them to the agent.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Feb 27, 2026, 04:01 PM