parallel-prompt-generator

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 10, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The generated prompt template includes instructions such as 'Do NOT ask for confirmation
  • proceed immediately with implementation'. This encourages the downstream agent to bypass standard human-in-the-loop safeguards during automated task execution.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill represents an indirect injection surface because it constructs prompts by verbatim copying of content from potentially untrusted task files.
  • Ingestion points: Reads data from manifest.json, context.md, contracts/, and markdown files within the tasks/ directory.
  • Boundary markers: Present. The template uses explicit headers (e.g., === CONTEXT ===, === OBJECTIVE ===, === IMPLEMENTATION REQUIREMENTS ===) to delimit different data sections.
  • Capability inventory: The generated prompts authorize the downstream agent to use file editing tools, execute test suites (pytest), run linters (ruff, mypy, eslint), and perform git commits.
  • Sanitization: Absent. The skill instructions explicitly state to 'Copy content EXACTLY from task files' and 'do not summarize or rewrite', which allows instructions embedded in task files to be treated as high-priority prompt content.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill documentation includes bash snippets for validating the integrity of generated files using grep and provides examples for manual agent execution using the claude CLI.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Mar 10, 2026, 06:50 AM