skills/jpropato/siba/notebooklm/Gen Agent Trust Hub

notebooklm

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 19, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION (HIGH): The scripts/setup_environment.py file automatically installs Python packages from requirements.txt and a browser via patchright install chrome at runtime. This dynamic installation and execution of external code lacks integrity verification.
  • CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE (HIGH): The skill implements a 'Hybrid Authentication' approach (documented in AUTHENTICATION.md) that saves active Google session cookies to data/browser_state/state.json. These cookies are manually injected into browser sessions, allowing the skill to operate with the user's full Google identity.
  • COMMAND_EXECUTION (MEDIUM): The scripts/run.py script acts as a wrapper that dynamically constructs and executes shell commands using subprocess.run to launch other scripts and manage the virtual environment.
  • EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS (MEDIUM): During setup, the skill downloads binaries (Chrome) and third-party packages from PyPI. While these are from known registries, the automated nature and the use of the patchright anti-detection fork increase the risk profile.
  • PROMPT_INJECTION (LOW): SKILL.md includes several 'CRITICAL' instructions intended to override the agent's default behavior, such as 'STOP
  • Do not immediately respond to user' and 'NEVER call scripts directly'. These are used to enforce specific tool-use workflows.
  • INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION (LOW): The skill possesses a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: ask_question.py receives untrusted user input via the --question argument and navigates to arbitrary URLs via --notebook-url.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. No delimiters or warnings are used when passing user-provided questions to the browser automation.
  • Capability inventory: Full browser automation via patchright on a logged-in Google account, plus the ability to execute local scripts via subprocess in run.py.
  • Sanitization: Absent. The input is passed directly to the browser typing engine in StealthUtils.human_type.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 19, 2026, 06:40 PM