solo-ops
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 10, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's logic in
scripts/solo_ops.pyexplicitly configures AI sessions to run without standard safety guardrails. Thebuild_launch_cmdfunction utilizes flags such as--dangerously-skip-permissionsfor the Claude CLI and--dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandboxfor the Codex CLI. These flags are designed to bypass permission prompts and environmental restrictions, which could allow an agent to perform unauthorized actions. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
subprocessmodule to perform high-privilege operations including git worktree management and terminal session control. Thepane_sendfunction injects text from task descriptions directly into active shell sessions usingwezterm cli send-textortmux send-keys. Because these task descriptions are often provided by external inputs, this creates a vector for command injection into the running terminal environment. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
cmd_installfunction modifies the host's configuration by creating a dedicated directory at~/.claude/skills/solo-ops/and establishing a persistent symlink at~/.local/bin/solo-ops. It also modifies file permissions usingchmod 0o755. Such actions extend the skill's influence beyond the immediate project and affect the user's global system environment. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The tool automates destructive or sensitive git operations through functions like
cmd_delete(usinggit worktree remove --forceandgit branch -D) andcmd_merge. These commands have the potential to delete work or modify the repository's history automatically based on AI-triggered commands.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata