skills/jsonlee12138/prompts/solo-ops/Gen Agent Trust Hub

solo-ops

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 10, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's logic in scripts/solo_ops.py explicitly configures AI sessions to run without standard safety guardrails. The build_launch_cmd function utilizes flags such as --dangerously-skip-permissions for the Claude CLI and --dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox for the Codex CLI. These flags are designed to bypass permission prompts and environmental restrictions, which could allow an agent to perform unauthorized actions.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the subprocess module to perform high-privilege operations including git worktree management and terminal session control. The pane_send function injects text from task descriptions directly into active shell sessions using wezterm cli send-text or tmux send-keys. Because these task descriptions are often provided by external inputs, this creates a vector for command injection into the running terminal environment.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The cmd_install function modifies the host's configuration by creating a dedicated directory at ~/.claude/skills/solo-ops/ and establishing a persistent symlink at ~/.local/bin/solo-ops. It also modifies file permissions using chmod 0o755. Such actions extend the skill's influence beyond the immediate project and affect the user's global system environment.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The tool automates destructive or sensitive git operations through functions like cmd_delete (using git worktree remove --force and git branch -D) and cmd_merge. These commands have the potential to delete work or modify the repository's history automatically based on AI-triggered commands.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Mar 10, 2026, 06:52 AM