security-audit
Security Audit Skill
A comprehensive, manual deep code audit protocol for security-critical systems. Includes fast "Vibe Coding Guardrails" for the most common AI-assisted development pitfalls.
When to Use
- Before major releases
- Security review requests
- Auditing authentication/payment flows
- When "audit" or "security" is mentioned
- After scaffolding a new project with AI (vibe coding sanity check)
- Before first deploy of any user-facing app
Audit Phases
Phase 0: Scope Definition
Define boundaries:
- FULL_SCAN: Entire codebase
- FEATURE_SCAN: Specific feature (
docs/features/[Name].md) - DIFF_SCAN:
git diff --stagedorgit diff HEAD~1
Phase 1: The Detective (Static Analysis)
# 1. Detect package manager & run dependency audit
# Auto-detect: check which lockfile exists
# pnpm-lock.yaml → pnpm audit
# package-lock.json → npm audit
# yarn.lock → yarn audit
# bun.lockb → bun pm audit (or bunx audit)
pnpm audit # ← swap for your package manager
# 2. Secret scanning (use jstar if available)
jstar detect
# 3. Manual grep patterns:
# Secrets
grep -rE "(api_key|secret|password|token)\s*[:=]\s*['\"\`][a-zA-Z0-9_\-\.]{10,}['\"\`]"
# RCE/Injection
grep -rE "(dangerouslySetInnerHTML|eval\(|exec\(|\.queryRaw)"
# Debugging
grep -rE "(console\.log|debugger|todo)"
Phase 1.5: Vibe Coding Guardrails (AI-Specific Checks)
These are fast, proactive checks that catch the most common vibe-coding security mistakes. Run these before deep analysis. Each takes ~2 minutes.
1.5.1 — Ghost/Phantom Package Detection (Supply Chain)
Risk: AI models hallucinate package names. Attackers register malware under those names.
Note:
npm viewqueries the npm registry directly and works regardless of your package manager (pnpm, yarn, bun, etc.). You don't need npm installed — it's just a registry lookup.
# For each unfamiliar dependency in package.json:
# 1. Verify it exists on the real registry (works with ANY package manager)
npm view <package-name> version # Should return a version, not 404
# Alt for pnpm users: pnpm info <package-name>
# Alt for bun users: bunx npm-cli view <package-name>
# 2. Check download stats (low downloads = suspicious)
npm view <package-name> --json | grep -E "downloads|modified"
# 3. Look for typosquatting (e.g., "lodahs" instead of "lodash")
# Compare against known-good package names
Action: Remove any package that doesn't exist on npm/PyPI or has suspiciously low downloads. Cross-reference with the official docs.
1.5.2 — AI-Built Auth Detection
Risk: AI happily generates custom login systems that look like they work but have invisible holes (no CSRF, weak hashing, no session expiry, etc.).
# Scan for custom auth patterns (red flags):
grep -rE "(bcrypt\.hash|jwt\.sign|createHash|crypto\.createCipher)" --include="*.ts" --include="*.tsx" --include="*.js"
grep -rE "(password.*=.*req\.(body|query)|session\[|cookie\[)" --include="*.ts" --include="*.tsx" --include="*.js"
# Check if a battle-tested auth provider is installed:
grep -E "(next-auth|@auth/|@clerk|@supabase/auth|auth0|lucia|better-auth)" package.json
Action: If custom auth is found AND no established provider exists:
- Flag as HIGH severity
- Recommend migration to: Clerk, NextAuth/Auth.js, Supabase Auth, Auth0, Lucia, or Better Auth
- Custom auth is only acceptable if the team has dedicated security expertise
1.5.3 — .gitignore Verification
Risk: Vibe coding moves fast. One missing .gitignore entry = secrets pushed to public GitHub. Bots scan for exposed keys 24/7.
# 1. Check .gitignore exists
test -f .gitignore && echo "EXISTS" || echo "MISSING — CRITICAL"
# 2. Verify essential entries are present:
for pattern in ".env" ".env.local" ".env.*.local" "node_modules" "*.pem" "*.key" ".DS_Store"; do
grep -qF "$pattern" .gitignore || echo "MISSING from .gitignore: $pattern"
done
# 3. Check if .env is already tracked (damage already done):
git ls-files --cached | grep -E "\.env$|\.env\.local$|\.pem$|\.key$"
# If output exists → secrets are already in git history. Rotate ALL keys immediately.
Action: If .gitignore is missing or incomplete → flag as CRITICAL. If .env is already tracked → CRITICAL + recommend git filter-branch or BFG Repo-Cleaner + immediate key rotation.
1.5.4 — Rate Limiting Check
Risk: Any public API route without rate limiting = bots will abuse it (spam, brute force, API cost drain).
# Check if rate limiting middleware is installed:
grep -E "(rate-limit|@upstash/ratelimit|express-rate-limit|limiter)" package.json
# Check if it's actually applied to API routes:
grep -rE "(rateLimit|rateLimiter|Ratelimit|slidingWindow)" --include="*.ts" --include="*.tsx" --include="*.js" src/app/api/ app/api/ pages/api/
Action: If no rate limiter is found on public API routes:
- Flag as HIGH severity
- Recommend:
@upstash/ratelimit(serverless),express-rate-limit(Express), or custom middleware - Minimum: 100 requests/hour/IP for forms, 10 requests/minute for auth endpoints
- AI-powered endpoints (LLM calls) should have even stricter limits to prevent cost attacks
1.5.5 — Row Level Security (RLS) Check
Risk: By default, databases let anyone see everyone's data. Forgetting RLS = instant data leak.
# Check if Supabase is used (most common vibe-coding DB):
grep -E "(supabase|@supabase)" package.json
# If Supabase: verify RLS is mentioned in migration files or setup:
grep -rE "(enable_rls|row_level_security|CREATE POLICY|ALTER TABLE.*ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY)" --include="*.sql" --include="*.ts"
# For Prisma: check for tenant/user scoping in queries:
grep -rE "where:.*userId|where:.*user_id|where:.*tenantId" --include="*.ts" --include="*.tsx"
# For raw SQL: check for user-scoped WHERE clauses:
grep -rE "(SELECT|UPDATE|DELETE).*FROM" --include="*.ts" --include="*.tsx" | grep -v "WHERE.*user"
Action: If database is used but no RLS/user-scoping is found:
- Flag as CRITICAL severity
- For Supabase: Enable RLS on ALL tables, create policies for
SELECT,INSERT,UPDATE,DELETE - For Prisma/raw SQL: Ensure every query that touches user data includes a
userId/tenantIdfilter - Rule of thumb: If a user can see another user's data, it's a data breach
Phase 2: The Graph (Data Flow)
- Identify Entry Points (Routes, Actions, CLI)
- Trace Input: User input → Service → Database
- Verify Validation: Zod/Typebox at edge boundaries
Phase 3: The Auditor (Spec vs Code)
- Read
docs/features/*.mdfor scope - Gap Analysis: Features in Docs but missing in Code
- Orphan Analysis: Code not in Docs (zombie code)
Phase 4: The Judge (Logic Probing)
Pick highest-risk file and simulate:
- "What if I send
null? Empty string? Negative ID?" - "What if two requests hit this at once?" (race conditions)
- "Can I access this Service function directly?" (auth bypass)
Phase 5: The Architect (Quality)
- Performance:
awaitin loops → N+1 queries - Bloat: Files > 200 lines? Functions > 50 lines?
- Types: Any use of
anyoras unknown? - Structure: Feature-Sliced Design compliance?
Phase 6: Report
Create .jstar/audit_report.md:
| Severity | Category | Location | Issue | Recommendation |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CRITICAL | SECURITY | api/auth |
... | ... |
| HIGH | LOGIC | service.ts:42 |
... | ... |
| HIGH | GUARDRAIL | package.json |
No rate limiter installed | Add @upstash/ratelimit |
Severities: CRITICAL, HIGH, WARNING, INFO
Categories: SECURITY, LOGIC, COMPLETENESS, QUALITY, GUARDRAIL
Phase 7: Remediation
For each CRITICAL/HIGH:
- Implement fix
- Run build/tests
- Re-verify with grep/logic check
- Stage changes