gsp-add-reference

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 11, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The bash command mkdir -p {PROJECT_PATH}/references in SKILL.md uses string interpolation for a path derived from scanned directory names. If a directory name contains shell metacharacters (e.g., semicolons or backticks), it could lead to arbitrary command execution. Mitigation: Use safe path joining and filesystem APIs instead of shell interpolation.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches content from user-provided URLs in Step 3 of SKILL.md. This can be exploited for Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) to access internal metadata services or probe the local network. Mitigation: Restrict fetching to specific domains and validate URLs before processing.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates a surface for Indirect Prompt Injection.
  • Ingestion points: The skill fetches content from external URLs and reads local files to create reference materials (found in SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: Absent; content is stored and used as context without delimiters or instructions for agents to disregard embedded commands.
  • Capability inventory: The skill and its downstream consumers (design, build, research agents) use Bash, Write, and Read tools.
  • Sanitization: Absent; the skill does not filter or sanitize malicious instructions found in reference content.
  • Downstream Impact: Reference content is explicitly passed to high-capability agents as trusted context, allowing an attacker to influence the build or design phases through a malicious webpage or file. Mitigation: Enclose reference data in unique delimiters (like XML tags) with explicit instructions for the agent to treat the content strictly as data.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Apr 11, 2026, 04:01 AM