ArgoCdCommand
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE (HIGH): The skill explicitly accesses sensitive identity and configuration files, including the specific kubeconfig
~/.kube/aks-rg-hypera-cafehyna-hub-configand SSH private keys such as~/.ssh/id_rsaand~/.ssh/azure_devops_keywithinWorkflows/RepoManage.mdandSKILL.md.\n- COMMAND_EXECUTION (HIGH): The skill facilitates administrative operations on Kubernetes and ArgoCD, including the deletion of applications (argocd app delete), removal of clusters (argocd cluster rm), and modification of RBAC project roles, which could lead to unauthorized resource modification if misused.\n- PROMPT_INJECTION (HIGH): The skill is susceptible to Indirect Prompt Injection. 1. Ingestion points: External data is ingested viaargocd app logsand application status manifests inWorkflows/Troubleshoot.md. 2. Boundary markers: There are no delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands in the processed data. 3. Capability inventory: The skill possesses broad write, delete, and execute capabilities across the managed infrastructure. 4. Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of ingested content is performed before processing or display.\n- PERSISTENCE (HIGH): InSKILL.md, the instructions recommend modifying the user's shell configuration files (~/.bashrcor~/.zshrc) to add persistent aliases, creating a permanent footprint on the host system.\n- DYNAMIC_EXECUTION (MEDIUM): The workflows inWorkflows/AppManage.mdandWorkflows/AppSetManage.mdusecat <<EOFpatterns to generate and then apply local YAML manifests, which constitutes runtime configuration generation and execution.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata