writing-skills
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- PROMPT_INJECTION (HIGH): The files
CLAUDE_MD_TESTING.mdandpersuasion-principles.mdfunction as a handbook for overriding AI agent behavior and safety filters. They include instructions designed to make an agent 'unable to rationalize away compliance' and use 'Authority' framing to 'eliminate decision fatigue and rationalization.' This is a meta-level injection technique aimed at systemic behavioral override. - COMMAND_EXECUTION (MEDIUM): The script
render-graphs.jsutilizeschild_process.execSyncto run the systemdotcommand (Graphviz) on content extracted via regex fromSKILL.md. While the script passes input via stdin, executing external binaries on content parsed from markdown files presents a risk if the external binary has vulnerabilities or if the parsing is subverted. - INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION (HIGH): The skill's documentation variants (Variant C and D) are designed to be placed in
CLAUDE.mdto permanently alter the agent's operating instructions, specifically forcing it to prioritize external 'skills' over its own reasoning, creating a high-risk surface for subsequent malicious skill injection.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata