caveman-compress
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 20, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/compress.pyexecutes theclaudeCLI to perform compression as a fallback mechanism when no API key is provided in the environment. * Evidence:subprocess.run(["claude", "--print"], input=prompt, text=True, capture_output=True, check=True)inscripts/compress.py. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface because it processes untrusted text from user-provided files and interpolates it into an LLM prompt. * Ingestion points: The
scripts/compress.pyfile reads the entire content of the user-targeted file (e.g.,CLAUDE.md). * Boundary markers: The prompt template inscripts/compress.pyuses aTEXT:header but lacks robust delimiters or explicit instructions for the model to ignore embedded commands in the input data. * Capability inventory: The orchestrator script has the ability to overwrite local files and execute external commands via subprocess. * Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering is performed on the file content before it is sent to the LLM for processing.
Audit Metadata