Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill extracts text, tables, and metadata from untrusted PDF files using libraries like
pypdfandpdfplumber. This content is a vector for indirect prompt injection.\n- Ingestion points: PDF data is read viapypdf.PdfReaderandpdfplumber.openacrossSKILL.mdand multiple utility scripts.\n- Boundary markers: The skill lacks delimiters or specific instructions to the agent to treat extracted document content as untrusted data.\n- Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands (qpdf,pdftotext,pdftk) and write files (writer.write,to_excel), which could be abused if an injection is successful.\n- Sanitization: No validation or sanitization of extracted content is performed.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The scriptscripts/fill_fillable_fields.pyuses monkeypatching to modify thepypdflibrary'sDictionaryObject.get_inheritedmethod at runtime. While intended to fix a specific bug in version 5.7.0, dynamic modification of library logic is a form of dynamic execution that can lead to unpredictable behavior if the environment or library version changes.
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