bench-commands
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 18, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- Data Exposure (HIGH): Hardcoded credentials for the MariaDB root user ('123') and the site administrator ('admin') are found in
SKILL.md,references/backup-restore.md,references/database-operations.md, andreferences/site-management.md. - Unverifiable Dependencies & Remote Code Execution (MEDIUM): The skill provides commands to download and install software from untrusted GitHub repositories (e.g.,
https://github.com/kehwar/frappe_soldamundo.git) inreferences/app-management.mdandreferences/app-development.md. These sources are not within the defined list of trusted organizations. - Dynamic Execution (MEDIUM):
references/testing-debugging.mdincludes instructions for running arbitrary Python code usingbench executeand interactive access throughbench console, which can be used to execute unverified logic in the application context. - Privilege Escalation (MEDIUM): The skill documentation describes using system commands to terminate processes (
pkill,fuser -k) and direct database root access inreferences/development-operations.mdandreferences/database-operations.md. - Indirect Prompt Injection (LOW): The skill structure facilitates the processing of untrusted external content.
- Ingestion points: External code is fetched from user-specified repositories via
bench get-appinreferences/app-management.md. - Boundary markers: Absent. There are no instructions to isolate or verify the content of the downloaded repositories.
- Capability inventory: Full access to the database (
mariadb), process management (pkill), and arbitrary Python execution (bench execute). - Sanitization: Absent. The skill does not describe any validation steps for the downloaded code before installation.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata