sharingan
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/clone_repo.shexecutes thegit clonecommand using the user-supplied--repo-urland--refparameters to pull repository data into a temporary directory. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill is designed to download content from arbitrary Git repositories. While it restricts activity to the Git protocol, it fetches untrusted data from remote sources into the local environment.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted content from external repositories and includes it in output artifacts intended for other AI agents.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/build_context_bundle.pyreads and processes the contents of all text files within the cloned repository. - Boundary markers: The skill utilizes citation markers such as
[cite: <chunk_id> <path>:<lines>]in itssummary.mdoutput. However, these markers do not prevent a downstream LLM from interpreting and obeying instructions embedded within the cited text. - Capability inventory: Although this skill specifically avoids executing repository code (as stated in
SKILL.md), its primary purpose is to prepare context for other skills or agent workflows, making it a vector for cross-skill injection. - Sanitization: The
sanitize_summary_textfunction inscripts/build_context_bundle.pyprovides basic redaction for secrets (e.g., API keys, passwords) but does not validate or sanitize the content for malicious instructions, hidden commands, or jailbreak attempts.
Audit Metadata