rules-workflows

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • Indirect Prompt Injection (HIGH): The skill is designed to ingest untrusted data (codebases) and transform that data into operational rules via workflow-rule-from-codebase.md. This represents a high-risk capability tier where malicious comments or documentation in a codebase could influence the agent's core behavior.
  • Evidence Chain (Category 8):
  • Ingestion points: workflow-rule-from-codebase.md reads external codebases; user feedback triggers rule changes.
  • Boundary markers: None specified in the SKILL.md definition.
  • Capability inventory: run_command, write_to_file, read_file (defined in allowed-tools).
  • Sanitization: None specified; the skill explicitly encourages 'Meta-Programming' (self-modification) based on this input.
  • Dynamic Execution (HIGH): The skill explicitly defines 'Self-Correction & Learning' as 'Meta-Programming', allowing the agent to modify its own instructions at runtime. If an attacker can influence the input to these triggers, they can effectively rewrite the agent's operating logic.
  • Command Execution (HIGH): The skill metadata explicitly authorizes the run_command tool. Given that the skill's logic involves executing workflows and standardizing context, there is a risk of this tool being misused by dynamically generated rules or workflows derived from untrusted sources.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 17, 2026, 12:00 AM