skill-creator
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION] (HIGH): The skill workflow is highly susceptible to indirect prompt injection during the research and initialization phases.\n
- Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to use
search_webandread_url_content(Step 2) and read user-filled artifacts (Phase 5) to inform skill creation.\n - Boundary markers: No delimiters or safety instructions are provided to the agent to distinguish between its instructions and the external data it is processing.\n
- Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to write new files via
init_skill.py, including executable scripts in thescripts/directory and instructional markdown inSKILL.md.\n - Sanitization: There is no evidence of content sanitization or validation before external data is used to generate logic or instructions.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (MEDIUM): The
init_skill.pyscript dynamically creates new files and applieschmod 0o755to make them executable. While this is intended behavior for a creator tool, it creates a mechanism for privilege adjustment on files whose content might be influenced by untrusted external sources.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (LOW): The skill uses local helper scripts (quick_validate.py,compare_skill.py) to perform structural analysis and comparisons. These scripts are safe and operate on local data only.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata