skills/kiwamizamurai/cctf/osint/Gen Agent Trust Hub

osint

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • Indirect Prompt Injection (HIGH): The skill is highly susceptible to Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8) due to its core function of processing untrusted external data.
  • Ingestion points: exiftool (reference/image.md) processes metadata from potentially malicious images; dig and whois (reference/domain.md) ingest data from attacker-controlled DNS records and WHOIS databases; curl (reference/domain.md) fetches data from the Wayback Machine API.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The skill provides no instructions to the agent to treat external tool outputs as untrusted or to ignore embedded instructions within that data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill allows Bash and Write (SKILL.md), enabling arbitrary command execution and file system modification if the agent is manipulated by processed data.
  • Sanitization: Absent. There are no patterns for escaping or validating the content retrieved from external OSINT sources before it is processed by the agent or passed to other shell commands.
  • External Dependencies (MEDIUM): The skill relies on several third-party tools that are not standard system utilities, which may require external downloads or installations.
  • Evidence: References to sherlock (reference/social.md), subfinder and amass (reference/domain.md), and exiftool (reference/image.md).
  • Command Execution (LOW): The skill heavily utilizes shell commands for its operations. While intended for OSINT, the use of unzip on untrusted Office documents (reference/social.md) and strings on arbitrary files carries inherent risks if the underlying utilities have vulnerabilities.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 05:23 AM