docx
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 3, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/office/soffice.pyimplements a runtime compilation and injection workflow. It writes C source code for a socket shim to a temporary file, compiles it into a shared library usinggcc, and then executes thesoffice(LibreOffice) binary withLD_PRELOADset to the generated library. This allows the skill to intercept and redirect low-level system calls within the office process. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/accept_changes.pydynamically generates a LibreOffice Basic macro and writes it to the application's macro directory (/tmp/libreoffice_docx_profile/user/basic/Standard/Module1.xba) to automate the acceptance of tracked changes. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of the
subprocess.runandsubprocess.runAPIs to execute external system tools, includingsoffice,pandoc,pdftoppm, andgcc. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to process and analyze untrusted Word documents, which exposes the agent to indirect prompt injection vulnerabilities.
- Ingestion points: Text extraction from
.docxfiles viapandocandpython-docxfor analysis, as specified inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not implement delimiters or instructions to prevent the agent from following commands embedded within the analyzed document content.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities for file system modification, arbitrary command execution (via gcc/soffice/pandoc), and process injection.
- Sanitization: None. Extracted text is passed directly into the agent's context without filtering for malicious prompt sequences.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
SKILL.mdfile recommends that the user install external dependencies at runtime, specifically thedocxNode.js package globally vianpmand several Python libraries (python-docx,pdf2image).
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata