claude-code-analyzer
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 28, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/github-discovery.shscript is vulnerable to command injection within theurlencodefunction. - Evidence: The function uses
python3 -cwith a string variable directly interpolated into single quotes:python3 -c "import urllib.parse; print(urllib.parse.quote('$string'))". - Risk: An attacker-controlled
QUERYparameter containing a single quote followed by Python code will be executed by the host's Python interpreter. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses sensitive local conversation history and configuration files.
- Evidence:
scripts/analyze.shreads data from${HOME}/.claude/projectsand${HOME}/.claude/settings.json. - Context: While this access is required for the skill's stated purpose of analyzing Claude Code usage, these files can contain sensitive information from previous AI interactions.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from local project files and logs, making it vulnerable to indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/analyze-claude-md.shreadspackage.jsonandCLAUDE.md;scripts/analyze.shparses.jsonlconversation logs. - Boundary markers: No specific delimiters are present in the script outputs to isolate untrusted data from instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to the
Bashtool and broad filesystem read permissions. - Sanitization: Although output is structured as JSON via
jq, no text-based sanitization is performed on the content of the analyzed files. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
scripts/github-discovery.shscript queries the GitHub API using theghCLI to find community resources. This interaction is limited to metadata retrieval from a well-known service and is documented here for completeness.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata