codex-mcp
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 14, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
codex_runtool includes acontext_cmdargument that is executed on the host system usingchild_process.execSync, enabling arbitrary shell command execution. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The MCP server implementation automatically approves file modifications and permission requests from the sub-process, bypassing typical security confirmation prompts.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructions utilize
<HARD-GATE>markers and 'Iron Law' directives to forcefully mandate that the agent override its default behavior and act only as a controller. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The server script reads the user's global configuration file at
~/.codex/config.tomlto extract model settings, exposing local configuration data. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The server script employs a basic deny-list for dangerous commands that is easily bypassed, while defaulting to accept for all other command execution requests and running the sub-process in 'danger-full-access' mode.
Audit Metadata