pdf

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • Indirect Prompt Injection (HIGH): The skill is designed to ingest untrusted data from external PDF files which serves as a primary attack vector.
  • Ingestion points: The skill uses PdfReader and pdfplumber.open to read local PDF files, and convert_from_path for OCR processing in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. There are no instructions provided to the agent to delimit or ignore instructions found within the processed PDFs.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses file writing capabilities (writer.write, combined_df.to_excel, c.save()) and encourages system command execution through tools like qpdf and pdftk.
  • Sanitization: Absent. The skill does not perform any validation or filtering of the content extracted from the PDFs before processing or using it in further logic.
  • Command Execution (MEDIUM): The skill documentation promotes the use of external CLI utilities.
  • Evidence: The SKILL.md file provides specific command-line examples for pdftotext, qpdf, and pdftk.
  • Risk: These tools are typically invoked via subprocess calls. If an agent's reasoning is compromised by instructions inside a PDF, these tools provide a mechanism for the attacker to perform unauthorized file manipulations or system operations.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 17, 2026, 12:04 AM