receiving-orders
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to process external feedback from PR comments and 'external sources', which constitutes a surface for indirect prompt injection. An attacker could embed malicious instructions within a code review comment to influence the agent's behavior. While the skill mandates a 'Verify before implementing' protocol, it lacks explicit boundary markers or automated sanitization for this untrusted input.
- Ingestion points: PR comments, external reviewer feedback (SKILL.md).
- Boundary markers: None explicitly defined for untrusted text.
- Capability inventory: The skill implies file modification capabilities ('IMPLEMENT') and utilizes the GitHub API for thread replies.
- Sanitization: No validation or escaping of external content is specified.
Audit Metadata