skills/kunhai-88/skills/docx/Gen Agent Trust Hub

docx

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • Indirect Prompt Injection (HIGH): The skill is designed to ingest and process untrusted external content (.docx files) by converting them to Markdown for agent consumption.
  • Ingestion points: pandoc --track-changes=all path-to-file.docx -o output.md and XML extraction from word/document.xml.
  • Boundary markers: None. Content is treated as raw data for the agent to 'read and analyze'.
  • Capability inventory: File writing (doc.save()), arbitrary command execution (pandoc, soffice, pdftoppm), and XML parsing.
  • Sanitization: While defusedxml is listed to prevent XXE, there is no sanitization of the natural language content extracted from documents, allowing an attacker to embed instructions that override agent behavior.
  • Command Execution (MEDIUM): The skill relies heavily on spawning subprocesses to run system binaries like pandoc, soffice (LibreOffice), and pdftoppm. If document filenames or parameters are not strictly sanitized, this presents a command injection risk.
  • Unverifiable Local Scripts & Logic (MEDIUM): The skill references local scripts (ooxml/scripts/unpack.py and pack.py) and documentation (ooxml.md) not provided in the snippet. The process of unpacking OOXML (which are ZIP files) is a common vector for 'Zip Slip' path traversal attacks if the extraction script does not validate target paths.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 11:49 PM