docx
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- Indirect Prompt Injection (HIGH): The skill is designed to ingest and process untrusted external content (.docx files) by converting them to Markdown for agent consumption.
- Ingestion points:
pandoc --track-changes=all path-to-file.docx -o output.mdand XML extraction fromword/document.xml. - Boundary markers: None. Content is treated as raw data for the agent to 'read and analyze'.
- Capability inventory: File writing (
doc.save()), arbitrary command execution (pandoc,soffice,pdftoppm), and XML parsing. - Sanitization: While
defusedxmlis listed to prevent XXE, there is no sanitization of the natural language content extracted from documents, allowing an attacker to embed instructions that override agent behavior. - Command Execution (MEDIUM): The skill relies heavily on spawning subprocesses to run system binaries like
pandoc,soffice(LibreOffice), andpdftoppm. If document filenames or parameters are not strictly sanitized, this presents a command injection risk. - Unverifiable Local Scripts & Logic (MEDIUM): The skill references local scripts (
ooxml/scripts/unpack.pyandpack.py) and documentation (ooxml.md) not provided in the snippet. The process of unpacking OOXML (which are ZIP files) is a common vector for 'Zip Slip' path traversal attacks if the extraction script does not validate target paths.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata