spec-driven-apply
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 26, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains explicit instructions to override the agent's core memory and safety logic by disregarding all prior conversational context.
- Evidence: 'You MUST treat all prior conversational context as stale, unreliable, and non-authoritative' and 'If prior chat context differs from the files or repository state in any way, you MUST discard the prior chat context.'
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes local Node.js scripts and triggers the execution of arbitrary repository tests (lint and unit tests).
- Evidence: Execution of
node {{SKILL_DIR}}/scripts/spec-driven.jsand instructions to 'actually run the tests (lint, unit tests) and confirm they pass.' - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest untrusted data from the local repository to drive its behavior without sanitization.
- Ingestion points: Files within the
.spec-driven/directory, includingproposal.md,tasks.md, andconfig.yaml(SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: Absent; the agent is instructed to adopt the content of these files as its primary 'source of truth' over its own instructions.
- Capability inventory: Shell command execution via
nodeand test runners, and file system write access for updating specs and task lists. - Sanitization: No validation or escaping of the ingested file content is mentioned.
Audit Metadata