skills/l-yifan/skills/guidance/Gen Agent Trust Hub

guidance

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 14, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill's examples for building 'ReAct Agents' (found in SKILL.md and references/examples.md) demonstrate a 'calculator' tool implemented using the Python eval() function. Specifically, the tool is defined as lambda expr: eval(expr). Since the input to this function is generated directly by the LLM (gen("action_input")), a malicious actor could use prompt injection to force the LLM to output executable code (e.g., __import__('os').system('...')), leading to full system compromise.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The inclusion of eval() in the tool-execution workflow facilitates arbitrary command execution on the host environment.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Analysis of prompt construction across all files reveals a significant vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the context through variables like question, text, message, and query in functions and templates.
  • Boundary markers: Most examples fail to use clear delimiters or instructions to the model to ignore instructions within the processed data (e.g., lm += f"Question: {question}\n\n").
  • Capability inventory: The presence of the eval()-based tool execution loop provides a high-impact capability for any successful injection to exploit.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation, escaping, or filtering for external content before it is interpolated into the prompt sequence.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Mar 14, 2026, 08:29 AM