improvement-learner
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/self_improve.pyexecutes several external commands usingsubprocess.run, including theclaudeCLI for evaluation,pytestfor reliability testing, andgitfor version control. While these calls use argument lists (avoidingshell=True), they operate on external file paths and content provided at runtime, which is a common pattern for development tools but requires trust in the input directory. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it reads the content of external
SKILL.mdfiles and interpolates them directly into the_ACCURACY_JUDGE_PROMPTused by the LLM judge. A malicious file could include instructions designed to deceive the LLM into providing a high score or bypassing evaluation criteria. - Ingestion points: Files are read from the path provided to the
--skill-pathargument inscripts/self_improve.py. - Boundary markers: The prompt uses
---delimiters around the skill content, but lacks specific instructions to the model to ignore any instructions found within that content. - Capability inventory: The tool possesses the capability to overwrite local files, delete directories (backups), and execute shell commands.
- Sanitization: The content is truncated to 8000 characters before being processed, but no sanitization or escaping of the markdown text is performed.
Audit Metadata