lark-calendar
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from calendar event descriptions and documents retrieved via
lark-cli calendar +getandlark-cli docs +fetch. This content is provided by users and could contain instructions designed to influence the agent's behavior. - Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the context through event descriptions (via
+getand+agenda) and document content (viadocs +fetch). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define specific delimiters or instructions to separate untrusted data from system prompts.
- Capability inventory: The agent has capabilities to modify calendar events, transfer ownership, and interact with IM/VC modules using
lark-cli. - Sanitization: There is no description of content sanitization or validation before the agent processes the retrieved text.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
lark-clibinary to perform all calendar management and coordination tasks, which is the intended functional design. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill facilitates the upload of local images to the vendor's cloud for use in event descriptions. This feature includes a security control that explicitly restricts file access to relative paths within the current working directory, preventing the reading of absolute system paths or files in parent directories.
- [SAFE]: The skill implements a 'Destructive Confirmation Gate' in
references/lark-calendar-recurring.md. This requires the agent to obtain explicit user confirmation before deleting or performing major updates to recurring event sequences, effectively mitigating the risk of accidental or malicious data loss.
Audit Metadata