lark-im
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill provides numerous methods for the agent to ingest untrusted data from external chat messages, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: Commands such as
+chat-messages-list,+threads-messages-list,+messages-mget, and+messages-searchretrieve message content and metadata from the Lark platform. - Boundary markers: The instructions lack specific guidance on using delimiters or strict formatting to isolate untrusted data from the agent's internal reasoning or system instructions.
- Capability inventory: The agent possesses powerful capabilities through
lark-cli, including sending messages, managing group memberships, updating chat configurations, and downloading files to the local system. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or instruction-filtering mechanisms are defined for processing the ingested message text before the agent acts upon it.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The core functionality of the skill is built around executing shell commands via the
lark-cliutility. The instructions guide the agent to interpolate various IDs, user-provided text, and file paths into these commands. This is consistent with the intended purpose of the skill as a developer tool. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill enables the agent to download message attachments (images, files, audio, and video) from Lark servers.
- Evidence: The
+messages-resources-downloadcommand and the--download-resourcesflag in listing shortcuts are used to save binary data to the local filesystem. - Mitigation: The skill documentation (e.g., in
references/lark-im-messages-resources-download.md) mentions security controls that restrict output paths to allowed directories like/tmpor the current working directory, preventing writes to sensitive system locations.
Audit Metadata