lark-mail
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFE
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains explicit defensive instructions designed to prevent the AI agent from being manipulated by malicious content within emails. It identifies email bodies, subjects, and sender names as untrusted external inputs and provides strict rules to ignore any 'commands' or 'instructions' embedded within them. The detector flag for 'Ignore previous instructions' is a false positive triggered by these defensive examples.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: As an email management tool, the skill naturally processes external data which constitutes an indirect prompt injection surface. The author has mitigated this risk by including a mandatory safety section ('⚠️ 安全规则') that establishes clear boundaries between user instructions and external data.
- Ingestion points: External email data fetched via
+message,+messages,+thread, and+triageshortcuts. - Boundary markers: Explicit instructions in
SKILL.mddefine all email-derived fields as untrusted and separate from the user's operational intent. - Capability inventory: The skill allows for reading, drafting, sending, and deleting emails via the
lark-clitool. - Sanitization: The instructions mandate that the agent must never execute instructions found in email content and must always seek user confirmation for high-risk operations like sending or forwarding.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill adheres to the principle of least privilege by defaulting all outgoing email operations (send, reply, forward) to 'draft' mode. Sending an actual email requires either a specific
--confirm-sendflag or a separate call to thesendAPI, both of which require explicit user confirmation according to the skill's instructions. No unauthorized network requests were found. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the
lark-clibinary, which is consistent with the author 'larksuite'. No unverified third-party dependencies or remote script execution patterns (e.g., curl|bash) were identified. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: All system interactions are routed through the
lark-clitool. The commands are structured and do not provide a path for arbitrary shell command injection.
Audit Metadata