skills/larksuite/cli/lark-vc/Gen Agent Trust Hub

lark-vc

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 13, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute various lark-cli commands for meeting operations. This includes lark-cli vc +search for historical data and lark-cli vc +notes for content retrieval. These commands are part of the intended vendor functionality.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill performs downloads of meeting artifacts (e.g., transcripts and whiteboard cover images) from the Lark platform to the local file system. Files are stored in organized subdirectories under ./minutes/. All downloads target the vendor's own infrastructure.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface. It provides instructions to fetch external markdown content from meeting notes (lark-cli docs +fetch) and parse it for specific tokens (e.g., <whiteboard token="xxx"/>). These tokens are then interpolated directly into CLI commands (lark-cli docs +media-download --token <whiteboard_token>). This pattern could be exploited if malicious content is placed in the meeting notes to perform argument injection.
  • Ingestion points: Meeting notes, transcripts, and AI summaries retrieved via the Lark API (files: SKILL.md, references/lark-vc-notes.md).
  • Boundary markers: No explicit markers or delimiters are defined to isolate untrusted content during parsing.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to write to the local file system and execute CLI commands with network access.
  • Sanitization: The instructions do not specify any validation or escaping for the tokens extracted from external content before they are used in shell commands.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
May 13, 2026, 03:05 AM