skills/latchagent/skill/clawcard/Gen Agent Trust Hub

clawcard

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 6, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Indirect Prompt Injection Surface. The skill ingests untrusted data from multiple sources which could contain malicious instructions designed to manipulate agent behavior. * Ingestion points: The skill reads external content via email.md (emails), sms.md (SMS), catalog-scrape.md (scraped URLs), and checkout.md (web page snapshots via MCP). * Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters defined to separate untrusted external data from the agent's core instructions. * Capability inventory: The agent has access to highly sensitive tools including virtual card creation and payment (cards.md), crypto wallet transfers (wallet.md), and secret retrieval from a credential vault (credentials.md). * Sanitization: No input validation or sanitization routines are mentioned for processing the contents of emails, messages, or web pages.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Dynamic Code Execution Capability. The skill exposes a tool for executing arbitrary source code. * Evidence: The run-code capability in catalog-compute.md allows the execution of source code in 60+ languages. While documented as sandboxed, providing an LLM with direct code execution capabilities increases the risk of local environment exploitation if security boundaries are bypassed.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Apr 6, 2026, 08:58 PM