skills/letta-ai/lettabot/bear-notes/Gen Agent Trust Hub

bear-notes

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 11, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill setup involves downloading and installing the grizzly CLI tool directly from an unverified third-party GitHub repository (github.com/tylerwince/grizzly) using the Go package manager.
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill accesses a sensitive Bear API authentication token stored at ~/.config/grizzly/token. This token is used to authenticate requests to the Bear app and is passed to the CLI tool during execution.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs various note management tasks by executing shell commands with the grizzly binary, often involving piped input (e.g., echo "..." | grizzly create).
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents an indirect prompt injection surface by reading note content from the Bear application, which could contain instructions intended to influence the agent.
  • Ingestion points: Note content retrieved via grizzly open-note or grizzly open-tag.
  • Boundary markers: The skill does not define specific delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the retrieved note data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can create notes (grizzly create) and append text (grizzly add-text), which could allow a malicious instruction to persist or propagate.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of content sanitization or validation performed on the data returned from Bear before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 11, 2026, 11:40 PM