skills/lev-os/agents/agent-browser/Gen Agent Trust Hub

agent-browser

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 11, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is entirely based on executing the agent-browser command-line interface to perform system-level browser automation, including navigating to URLs, taking screenshots, and interacting with page elements.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The tool includes commands to access sensitive browser session data, such as agent-browser cookies and agent-browser storage local. While these are functional requirements for testing and automation, they could be leveraged to extract authentication tokens or session information if used maliciously.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The agent-browser eval and agent-browser wait --fn commands allow for the execution of arbitrary JavaScript code within the browser context. This provides a mechanism for dynamic code execution on any website the agent visits.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: As a tool that ingests and processes content from external websites via agent-browser snapshot and get commands, it is susceptible to indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through page snapshots and text extraction in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters mentioned to prevent the agent from following instructions embedded within the processed web content.
  • Capability inventory: The tool possesses high-privilege capabilities including form filling (fill), file uploads (upload), JavaScript execution (eval), and session data access (cookies).
  • Sanitization: The skill documentation does not outline any sanitization or filtering of the extracted web content before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Mar 11, 2026, 01:23 PM