gitsync
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 7, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/gitsync.shuses theevalcommand on thecodevariable within theresolve_codefunction. This allows for arbitrary shell command execution if a project code or path includes shell metacharacters such as backticks or$(...), which could lead to unauthorized system control. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill establishes an indirect prompt injection surface in
SKILL.mdby instructing the agent to analyzegit statusandgit diffoutputs for conflict resolution. Malicious instructions embedded in a repository's file content or filenames could manipulate the agent's subsequent actions. - Ingestion points: Raw output from
git statusandgit diffcommands processed by the agent in File: SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: None. The instructions do not provide delimiters or "ignore" markers for the untrusted git output.
- Capability inventory: The agent can execute shell commands, perform file system operations, and push changes to remote repositories (referenced in File: scripts/gitsync.sh).
- Sanitization: No sanitization or validation logic is present to filter malicious instructions from the repository data before processing.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata