skills/lev-os/agents/llm-tldr/Gen Agent Trust Hub

llm-tldr

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 1, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The SKILL.md file includes a 'Prompt Architect Overlay' which uses role definition and persona instructions ('prompt-architect-enhanced specialist') to guide the agent's behavior. While this is a form of instruction override, it is intended to ensure deterministic execution of the skill's features.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill represents a surface for indirect prompt injection because it processes untrusted data (source code) and provides summaries to the AI. If a codebase contains malicious instructions within comments or strings, the agent could potentially be influenced when reading the structured output.
  • Ingestion points: tldr warm, tldr extract, and tldr context commands which read all files in a project.
  • Boundary markers: None explicitly specified in the tool output descriptions; content is delivered as structured markdown/text summaries.
  • Capability inventory: The tool can read/write to a local cache directory (.tldr/), execute CLI commands, and run a background daemon.
  • Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering of codebase strings/comments is mentioned to prevent LLM instruction obedience.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions require the installation of the llm-tldr package from the official PyPI registry, which also pulls in dependencies such as sentence-transformers and faiss-cpu for its semantic search functionality.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow involves running various local commands via the tldr CLI to warm indexes, generate call graphs, and perform semantic searches. It also includes starting and stopping a background daemon process.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Mar 1, 2026, 09:43 AM