using-devops-skills

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION] (HIGH): The skill uses extreme imperative language to hijack the agent's decision-making logic and override user intent.
  • Evidence: Use of markers like "ABSOLUTELY MUST", "NOT NEGOTIABLE", and "YOU DO NOT HAVE A CHOICE" inside <EXTREMELY-IMPORTANT> tags.
  • Instruction Override: The prompt explicitly tells the agent to ignore user instructions if they attempt to bypass these workflows ("Instructions say WHAT, not HOW... doesn't mean skip workflows").
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (MEDIUM): The skill sets up a workflow for executing high-privilege commands involving cloud infrastructure (AWS) and Infrastructure as Code (Terraform).
  • Unverifiable Safety Claims: The skill claims that dangerous commands like terraform destroy are "intercepted by safety hooks." Per global security rules, these self-referential claims of safety are ignored; the skill provides the instructions to attempt these operations regardless.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION] (MEDIUM): The mandatory "1% chance" invocation rule increases the system's attack surface by forcing the agent to ingest and act upon data from external tools on almost every input.
  • Ingestion Points: SKILL.md references data from terraform plan, git history, and code review comments.
  • Boundary Markers: None identified; the agent is instructed to "follow skill exactly."
  • Capability Inventory: The skill enables subprocess calls for Terraform, AWS CLI, and Git workflows.
  • Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization or validation of the external content being processed.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 01:04 PM