tavily-search
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 13, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The setup instructions in
SKILL.mdinclude a command to download and execute the installation script for theuvpackage manager fromastral.sh. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches the
httpxlibrary and theuvtool from official and well-known repositories during the initial setup and runtime. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Transmits user-provided queries and the Tavily API key to the official
api.tavily.comendpoint for search and extraction services. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from the web (search snippets and article bodies), creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The
scripts/search.pyscript receives data from the Tavily API, which crawls external websites controlled by third parties. - Boundary markers: The output is formatted with simple labels like 'RESULTS:' and 'ANSWER:', but does not utilize robust delimiters or explicit instructions to prevent the agent from following commands embedded in the retrieved web content.
- Capability inventory: The script performs network requests via
httpx, and the skill environment supports shell command execution viauv. - Sanitization: The skill does not perform sanitization, filtering, or safety checks on the retrieved web content before presenting it to the agent.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata