inno-experiment-dev
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 19, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The Machine Learning Agent instructions permit the dynamic installation of missing Python packages via
conda installorpip install(e.g.,pip install <package> --no-depsinreferences/ml_agent_instructions.md). This allows for the introduction of unverified code into the environment. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The workflow involves generating Python scripts (e.g.,
run_training_testing.py) based on external inputs and then executing them using therun_pythontool. This pattern is risky as the generated code is derived from untrusted sources like user-provided ideas and reference papers. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes shell tools for a wide range of tasks, including directory management (
mkdir -p), file listing (ls,tree), and script execution (execute_command). These capabilities provide a broad attack surface if the agent is misled by malicious inputs. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface by ingesting external data and interpolating it directly into prompts for downstream agents (Coding Plan Agent, ML Agent, Judge Agent).
- Ingestion points: Data entering the context includes
survey_res(user idea),references(source papers), andcode_survey_res(survey notes), as detailed inSKILL.mdand used in templates likeprompts/build_plan_query.md. - Boundary markers: Prompt templates in
prompts/(e.g.,build_iteration_query.md,build_ml_dev_query.md) lack delimiters (such as XML tags or triple quotes) or 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings for the interpolated variables. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses powerful capabilities including arbitrary shell command execution, file system modification, and package installation.
- Sanitization: No validation, escaping, or filtering of the ingested external content is implemented before it is used to construct prompts.
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