ljg-the-one

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 26, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill explicitly instructs the agent to execute the command open /tmp/essence-card-{概念名称}.html to display the results.
  • Evidence: Found in Step 5 of SKILL.md.
  • Risk: If the variable {概念名称} is derived from untrusted user input and not properly sanitized, it could potentially lead to command injection attacks.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill's HTML template fetches a third-party JavaScript library from a remote source.
  • Evidence: <script src="https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/mermaid/dist/mermaid.min.js"></script> in assets/template.html.
  • Note: Fetches the Mermaid.js library from the JSDelivr CDN, which is a well-known and trusted service for front-end assets.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data and is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (Category 8).
  • Ingestion points: Accepts books, concept descriptions, article URLs, or sentences in Step 1 of SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. No explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present in the prompt structure.
  • Capability inventory: The skill performs file system writes to /tmp and executes the open command.
  • Sanitization: Absent. No evidence of input sanitization or validation for the processed content or the resulting file names.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Feb 26, 2026, 09:27 AM