note-creator
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION] (HIGH): Indirect Prompt Injection Surface.
- Ingestion points: The skill ingests
user_promptandoptional_context_filesas primary inputs inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiter or 'ignore embedded instructions' markers are defined when passing these inputs to downstream skills like
obsidian-markdownorjson-canvas. - Capability inventory: The skill has
Write,Edit, andBash(mkdir:*, echo:*, cat:*)tools enabled, allowing it to modify the local file system. - Sanitization: While filename sanitization exists in
rules/naming.rules.md, the content of the generated notes and diagrams is derived from untrusted user input without sanitization. - Risk: An attacker could provide a prompt that causes the downstream generation skills to output malicious content or attempt to escape their own constraints.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (MEDIUM): Parameterized Shell Command Risks.
- Evidence: The skill uses
Bash(mkdir:*, echo:*, cat:*)to manage directories and files (documented inSKILL.md). - Sanitization:
rules/naming.rules.mdspecifies removing[ / \ : * ? " < > | ]from titles. However, it does not explicitly filter other shell-sensitive characters like backticks (`), dollar signs ($), or semicolons (;). - Risk: If the underlying tool implementation does not properly escape these characters, a malicious title could potentially lead to command injection during the
mkdirorechooperations.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata