coding-agent

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 14, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill implements a bash tool with an 'elevated' parameter that allows commands to run on the host instead of a sandbox, creating a significant risk of privilege escalation.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation instructs users to install a third-party Node.js package from an unverified personal namespace.\n
  • Evidence: npm install -g @mariozechner/pi-coding-agent found in SKILL.md.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides explicit instructions to bypass safety features and sandboxing in external coding tools.\n
  • Evidence: Recommended use of --yolo (described as 'NO sandbox, NO approvals') and --permission-mode bypassPermissions flags in SKILL.md.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exposes a significant surface for indirect prompt injection through the automated processing of external repository data.\n
  • Ingestion points: Commands such as git clone and gh pr checkout are used to pull external, untrusted content (SKILL.md).\n
  • Boundary markers: No delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present in the provided workflows.\n
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses full shell execution capabilities through the bash tool and direct process interaction via the submit and write actions (SKILL.md).\n
  • Sanitization: External code and pull request data are processed and executed without sanitization or validation.\n- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates remote code execution by automating the retrieval and processing of external code from GitHub, which is then executed by agents in high-privilege or 'un-sandboxed' modes.\n
  • Evidence: Workflows in SKILL.md involve cloning arbitrary repositories and checking out pull requests for automated agent execution.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Mar 14, 2026, 12:13 AM