cleanup
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 6, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute shell commands (
git worktree remove .worktrees/<name>andgit branch -d <merged-branch-x>) using variables derived from external VCS data. If branch names or worktree names contain shell metacharacters (e.g.,;,&,|), it could lead to arbitrary command execution on the host machine. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection by ingesting untrusted data from PR comments and metadata via the
exarchos_orchestrateMCP action. Attackers with access to the repository could embed malicious instructions in PRs to manipulate the agent's behavior during the cleanup process. - Ingestion points: Data enters the context via
exarchos_orchestrate({ action: "list_prs" })andexarchos_orchestrate({ action: "get_pr_comments" })as described inSKILL.mdandreferences/merge-verification.md. - Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not provide delimiters or warnings to ignore embedded instructions in the fetched data.
- Capability inventory: The agent has capabilities to modify the file system via
gitshell commands and change workflow states viamcp__plugin_exarchos_exarchos__exarchos_workflow. - Sanitization: No sanitization, escaping, or validation of the branch names or PR content is performed before interpolation into shell commands or prompts.
Audit Metadata