cx-design
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [Indirect Prompt Injection] (HIGH): The skill ingests untrusted data from local PRD files and source code and uses it to generate design documentation and GitHub Issues. This creates a surface where malicious instructions in a PRD or code comment could influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: Reads
.claude/cx/features/{dev_id}-{feature}/prd.mdand scans local source code using an 'Explore subagent'. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands in the ingested data were found.
- Capability inventory: Executes shell commands (
git,jq), writes to the local filesystem (design.md), and performs network operations (GitHub Issue creation viagithub_sync). - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the content extracted from PRDs or source code is performed before it is used in prompts or sent to GitHub.
- [Command Execution] (MEDIUM): The skill uses shell commands to resolve the project environment and read configuration data.
- Evidence:
PROJECT_ROOT=$(git rev-parse --show-toplevel)andjq -r '.developer_id' "$PROJECT_ROOT/.claude/cx/config.json"are executed during the initialization step. - [Data Exfiltration] (MEDIUM): Content derived from the local environment, including potential secrets if leaked into PRDs or code, can be transmitted externally via the GitHub synchronization feature.
- Evidence: Step 5 explicitly supports creating GitHub Issues based on the generated design content when
config.github_syncis enabled.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata