web-search
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 18, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the installation of the
beltCLI tool (npx skills add belt-sh/cli) and references several other external skills from theinference-shorganization. It also links to external installation scripts and documentation hosted on a third-party GitHub repository (https://raw.githubusercontent.com/inference-sh/skills/...). - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to fetch and process arbitrary content from the public internet, creating a significant surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through the output of the Tavily and Exa search/extract apps (e.g.,
tavily/search-assistant,exa/extract) as described inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Although examples show the use of placeholders like
<search-results>, there are no strict instructions or system-level delimiters defined to prevent the agent from obeying instructions embedded within the retrieved web content. - Capability inventory: The skill has access to the
Bashtool (specifically thebeltcommand) and demonstrates workflows where external data is piped into LLM models for further action. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, filtering, or validation of the content retrieved from external URLs before it is provided to the agent.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the execution of shell commands through the
beltCLI. While theallowed-toolsconfiguration limits execution to this specific tool, it represents an reliance on a third-party binary that interacts with external APIs.
Audit Metadata