mcp-management

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
  • Remote Code Execution (HIGH): The skill executes arbitrary commands specified in .claude/.mcp.json using StdioClientTransport. This provides a direct path for code execution if the configuration is malicious or tampered with.
  • External Downloads (HIGH): Documentation recommends using npx -y to download and run packages like @modelcontextprotocol/server-memory and @modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem without version pinning or source verification.
  • Indirect Prompt Injection (HIGH): The skill handles untrusted data from external MCP servers entering the agent context without sanitization or boundary markers. (1) Ingestion points: scripts/mcp-client.ts functions getAllTools, getAllPrompts, and getAllResources. (2) Boundary markers: Absent; no instructions are provided to the agent to treat server outputs as untrusted. (3) Capability inventory: High-privilege command execution and file writing (assets/tools.json). (4) Sanitization: Absent.
  • Command Execution (HIGH): The CLI tool (scripts/cli.ts) facilitates the execution of arbitrary tools on connected servers, which includes filesystem access and browser automation capabilities.
  • Credentials Unsafe (MEDIUM): The configuration guide provides examples of hardcoding API keys in .claude/.mcp.json, which could lead to credential exposure if the configuration file is accidentally shared or committed to version control.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 11:29 AM