mcp-builder
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 21, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (MEDIUM): The
scripts/connections.pyfile implements theMCPConnectionStdioclass, which utilizes themcplibrary to spawn subprocesses. It accepts acommandstring andargslist, allowing the execution of any system command. This is a core functionality for local MCP development but represents a high-privilege capability that lacks restricted environment constraints. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS] (MEDIUM): The skill instructions in
SKILL.mddirect the agent to fetch remote content usingWebFetchfrommodelcontextprotocol.ioand GitHub. Additionally, it recommends usingnpx @modelcontextprotocol/inspector, which downloads and executes a Node.js package at runtime. Since themodelcontextprotocolorganization is not explicitly on the trusted list, these are treated as unverifiable remote dependencies. - [DATA_EXPOSURE] (LOW): The connection utility in
scripts/connections.pyallows passing environment variables to spawned processes. This is intended for authentication (API keys) but could be misused to expose sensitive environment data if the agent is tricked into running a malicious command or using an untrusted environment. - [PROMPT_INJECTION] (LOW): The workflow relies heavily on the agent ingesting external documentation and API specifications. This creates an attack surface for indirect prompt injection, where malicious instructions embedded in external docs or API schemas could hijack the agent's behavior during the MCP server construction process.
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