Solidity Security Audit Skill

Purpose

Perform professional-grade smart contract security audits following methodologies established by the world's leading Web3 security firms. Produce actionable, severity-classified findings with remediation guidance.

Audit Mode Selection

Before starting, identify the audit mode:

Mode	When to Use	Entry Point
Full Audit	First-time review of a codebase	Phases 1–5 below
Re-audit / Diff	Previous audit exists; team applied fixes or added features	`references/diff-audit.md`
Integration Review	Contract integrates Uniswap, Chainlink, Aave, Curve, etc.	`references/defi-integrations.md` + Phase 3
Quick Scan	Rapid assessment, limited time	`references/quick-reference.md` — abbreviated Phase 0 (5 min max), run Phases 1–2 only, focus Phase 3 on Critical/High patterns from `quick-reference.md`

For severity classification guidance at any point, consult references/severity-decision-tree.md.

Full Audit Workflow

Execute audits in this order. Each phase builds on the previous one.

Phase 0 — Threat Modeling

Audit by Protocol Type — Quick Routing

Protocol Type	Primary Reference	DeFi Checklist Section	Key Case Studies
AMM / DEX	`defi-integrations.md §Uniswap`	`defi-checklist.md §AMM`	Curve, Cork Protocol
Lending / Borrowing	`defi-integrations.md §Aave`	`defi-checklist.md §Lending`	Euler, Abracadabra
Vault / Yield (ERC-4626)	`defi-integrations.md §ERC-4626`	`defi-checklist.md §Vault`	—
Bridge / Messaging	`l2-crosschain.md`	`defi-checklist.md §Bridge`	Nomad, Wormhole
Governance / DAO	`vulnerability-taxonomy.md §15`	`defi-checklist.md §Governance`	Beanstalk, Compound
Perpetual DEX	`perpetual-dex.md`	`defi-checklist.md §Perp`	Hyperliquid HLP
LST / Restaking	`staking-consensus.md`	`defi-checklist.md §Restaking`	Bybit
Uniswap V4 Hook	`defi-integrations.md §V4-Hooks`	`defi-checklist.md §V4-Hooks`	Cork Protocol
ZK / Rollup	`zkvm-specific.md`	`l2-crosschain.md §ZK`	—
Account Abstraction	`account-abstraction.md`	`audit-questions.md §AA`	—
AI-Generated Code	`ai-code-patterns.md`	`audit-questions.md §AI`	Bybit (supply chain)
Intent / Solver	`intent-protocols.md`	`defi-checklist.md §Intents`	—
CeDeFi / Synthetic	`vulnerability-taxonomy.md §4.7`	`defi-checklist.md §CeDeFi`	xUSD ($285M)

Before touching code, build a mental model of what the protocol does and what can go wrong economically. This shapes where you spend time in Phase 3.

Map the actors: who interacts with this protocol?
- Unprivileged users, liquidity providers, borrowers
- Privileged roles: admin, guardian, keeper, fee recipient
- External actors: MEV bots, flash loan attackers, liquidators, governance participants
Identify the crown jewels: what assets or rights are at risk?
- User funds locked in the protocol
- Protocol-owned reserves or insurance funds
- Governance control (ability to upgrade, change parameters, drain)
Define critical invariants: what must NEVER be false?
- Solvency: total liabilities ≤ total assets
- Accounting: sum of individual balances = tracked total
- Access: only authorized callers can execute privileged operations
Trace trust boundaries: what external systems does this protocol trust?
- Oracles (Chainlink, TWAP, custom)
- External protocol integrations (Uniswap, Aave, Curve)
- Bridging / messaging layers (LayerZero, CCIP, Wormhole)
- Multisig signers or governance
Estimate MEV surface: what operations create profitable ordering opportunities?
- Liquidations, arbitrage, sandwich-able swaps
- Front-runnable reveals, claims, or settlements
Note upgrade/admin blast radius: if the admin key or a multisig is compromised, what is the maximum damage? Is there a timelock? A pause mechanism?

Output: a 5–10 line threat summary that focuses the manual review in Phase 3 on the highest-value attack paths. Skip this only for Quick Scan mode.

Phase 1 — Reconnaissance

Identify the Solidity version, compiler settings, and framework (Hardhat/Foundry)
Map the contract architecture: inheritance tree, library usage, external dependencies
Identify the protocol type (DeFi lending, AMM, NFT, governance, bridge, vault, etc.)
Determine the trust model: who are the privileged roles? What can they do?
List all external integrations (oracles, other protocols, token standards)

Phase 2 — Automated Analysis

If tools are available in the environment, run them in this order:

# Static analysis
slither . --json slither-report.json

# Compile and test
forge build
forge test --gas-report

# Custom detectors (if Aderyn is available)
aderyn .

If tools are NOT available, perform manual static analysis covering the same categories these tools check. Read references/tool-integration.md for details.

Phase 3 — Manual Review (Core)

This is where the highest-value findings come from. Follow the vulnerability taxonomy in references/vulnerability-taxonomy.md systematically:

CRITICAL PRIORITY — Check these first:

Reentrancy (all variants: cross-function, cross-contract, read-only)
Access control flaws (missing modifiers, incorrect role checks, unprotected initializers)
Price oracle manipulation (spot price usage, single oracle dependency, TWAP bypass)
Flash loan attack vectors
Proxy/upgrade vulnerabilities (storage collision, uninitialized implementation, UUPS gaps)
Unchecked external calls and return values
ERC-7702 delegation risks (if EOAs or authorization tuples are present: malicious delegation target, stale authorization replay, nonce race, re-initialization of delegated code) — see references/vulnerability-taxonomy.md §17

HIGH PRIORITY:

Integer overflow/underflow (pre-0.8.x or unchecked blocks)
Logic errors in business rules (token minting, reward calculations, fee distribution)
Front-running and MEV exposure (sandwich attacks, transaction ordering dependence)
Denial of Service vectors (gas griefing, unbounded loops, block gas limit)
Signature replay and malleability
Delegatecall to untrusted contracts

MEDIUM PRIORITY:

Gas optimization issues that affect usability
Missing event emissions for state changes
Centralization risks and single points of failure
Timestamp dependence
Floating pragma versions
Missing zero-address checks

LOW / INFORMATIONAL:

Code style and readability
Unused variables and imports
Missing NatSpec documentation
Redundant code patterns

Phase 4 — DeFi-Specific Analysis

When auditing DeFi protocols, apply the specialized checklist from references/defi-checklist.md. Key areas:

Lending protocols: Liquidation logic, collateral factor manipulation, bad debt scenarios
AMMs/DEXs: Slippage protection, price impact calculations, LP token accounting
Vaults/Yield: Share price manipulation (inflation attack), withdrawal queue logic
Bridges: Message verification, replay protection, validator trust assumptions
Governance: Vote manipulation, flash loan governance attacks, timelock bypass
Staking: Reward calculation precision, stake/unstake timing attacks

Phase 5 — Report Generation

Structure every finding using this format:

## [SEVERITY-ID] Title

**Severity**: Critical | High | Medium | Low | Informational
**Category**: (from vulnerability taxonomy)
**Location**: `ContractName.sol#L42-L58`

### Description
Clear explanation of the vulnerability, why it exists, and what an attacker could do.

### Impact
Concrete description of damage: funds at risk, protocol disruption, data corruption.

### Proof of Concept
Step-by-step exploit scenario or code demonstrating the issue.

### Recommendation
Specific code changes to fix the vulnerability. Include example code when possible.

Classify severity following the standard used by Immunefi, Code4rena, and Sherlock:

Severity	Criteria
Critical	Direct loss of funds, permanent protocol corruption, bypass of all access controls
High	Conditional loss of funds, significant protocol disruption, privilege escalation
Medium	Indirect loss, limited impact requiring specific conditions, griefing with cost
Low	Minor issues, best practice violations, theoretical edge cases
Informational	Code quality, gas optimizations, documentation gaps

Key Patterns to Enforce

Checks-Effects-Interactions (CEI)

Every function that modifies state and makes external calls must follow CEI. Verify state changes happen BEFORE any external call.

Pull Over Push

Favor withdrawal patterns over direct transfers. Let users claim rather than pushing funds to them automatically.

Least Privilege

Every function should have the minimum required access level. Prefer role-based access control (OpenZeppelin AccessControl) over single-owner patterns.

Defense in Depth

No single security mechanism should be the only protection. Layer reentrancy guards, access controls, input validation, and invariant checks.

Reference Materials

For detailed vulnerability descriptions, exploit examples, and remediation patterns, consult these reference files:

Core References

references/vulnerability-taxonomy.md — 50+ vulnerability types with code examples
references/defi-checklist.md — Protocol-specific checklists (lending, AMM, vaults, bridges, tokens)
references/industry-standards.md — SWC Registry, severity classification, security EIPs
references/quick-reference.md — One-page cheat sheet for rapid security assessment

Audit Guides

references/audit-questions.md — Systematic questions for each function type
references/secure-patterns.md — Secure code patterns to compare against
references/report-template.md — Professional audit report format

Testing & Tools

references/tool-integration.md — Slither, Echidna, Foundry, Halmos, custom detectors
references/automated-detection.md — Regex patterns for automated scanning
references/poc-templates.md — Foundry templates for proving exploits
references/invariants.md — Protocol invariants for testing

Specialized

references/l2-crosschain.md — L2 sequencer risks, bridge security, cross-chain patterns
references/account-abstraction.md — ERC-4337 security: accounts, paymasters, bundlers
references/exploit-case-studies.md — Real-world exploits analyzed (DAO, Euler, Curve, etc.)

New in v2

references/diff-audit.md — Re-audit and change review methodology
references/severity-decision-tree.md — Structured severity classification decision trees
references/defi-integrations.md — Secure integration patterns: Uniswap v3/v4, Chainlink, Aave, Curve, Balancer

New in v3

references/intent-protocols.md §8 — ERC-7683 Cross-Chain Intents (live on Base/Arbitrum): filler trust model, parameter substitution, double-fill, settlement finality race
references/staking-consensus.md — Pectra upgrade security: EIP-7002 (triggerable exits), EIP-7251 (MaxEB + slashing amplification), EIP-6110 (on-chain deposits)
references/industry-standards.md — OWASP Smart Contract Top 10 2025 table added

New in v3.4.0

references/ai-code-patterns.md — LLM-specific Solidity anti-patterns: CEI violations, broken reentrancy guards, hallucinated interfaces, incomplete access control, EIP-712 missing nonce/chainId; red flags for AI-generated code; full audit checklist for vibe-coded contracts
references/glamsterdam.md — Glamsterdam upgrade security: EIP-7732 ePBS payload withholding + preconfirmation timing attacks; EIP-7928 BALs MEV transparency and parallelization race conditions; audit checklists for both EIPs
references/exploit-case-studies.md #15 — xUSD/Stream Finance $285M (Nov 2025): hardcoded oracle adapter ($1.00) feeding recursive leverage loop; why pure oracle adapters evade static analysis
references/exploit-case-studies.md #16 — Hyperliquid HLP: vault dual-role as market maker + bad debt absorber; proprietary oracle centralization; low-liquidity market exploitation (JELLY incident)
references/perpetual-dex.md §10-§14 — dYdX v4 (Cosmos CLOB, CometBFT MEV), Gains Network (DAI vault solvency), advanced funding rate manipulation (skew-based + time-weighted), insurance fund drain attacks, cross-margin contagion and isolated-to-cross timing attack
references/zkvm-specific.md §7-§10 — Noir unconstrained function risks + public/private input confusion, SP1 cycle DoS + committed output integrity, Polygon CDK sequencer centralization + LxLy bridge replay, folding schemes (Nova/SuperNova/HyperNova IVC)
SKILL.md Phase 0 — "Audit by Protocol Type" quick routing table: 13 protocol types mapped to primary reference, checklist section, and key case studies

New in v3.3.0

references/vulnerability-taxonomy.md §4.6 — Oracle chain complexity for restaking assets (Moonwell pattern): staleness propagation across chained adapters
references/vulnerability-taxonomy.md §4.7 — Oracle price hardcoding as contagion amplifier (xUSD/Stream Finance $285M, Nov 2025): recursive leverage via $1.00 collateral price
references/vulnerability-taxonomy.md §6.7 — Custom storage layout collisions (solc 0.8.29, multiple inheritance + --via-ir)
references/vulnerability-taxonomy.md §9.5 — Cross-chain sandwich via source-chain event leakage (arXiv Nov 2025, 21.4% profit rate)
references/vulnerability-taxonomy.md §12.7 — Multi-action router security flag reset (Abracadabra cook() $1.8M, Oct 2025): OR-accumulation vs direct assignment
references/vulnerability-taxonomy.md §17.6 — EIP-7702 sweeper campaigns + tx.origin guard bypass post-Pectra ($2.5M+, May 2025)
references/vulnerability-taxonomy.md §19.8 — TransientStorageClearingHelperCollision: delete on transient var emits sstore (solc 0.8.28–0.8.33 + --via-ir, distinct from §19.6)
references/exploit-case-studies.md — Cork Protocol V4 hook exploit ($11M, May 2025): first major production V4 hook exploit, missing onlyPoolManager
references/defi-checklist.md — onlyPoolManager requirement for all V4 callbacks (Cork Protocol pattern), CeDeFi & Recursive Leverage section, sweepUnclaimed() access control
references/account-abstraction.md — ERC-7579: module poisoning via onUninstall revert, stale state after reinstallation, executor delegatecall abuse, ERC-7484 registry
references/account-abstraction.md — ERC-7821 minimal batch executor: full EIP-712 replay protection checklist
references/l2-crosschain.md — Cross-chain sandwich attacks, Fusaka EIP-7825 gas cap (16.78M), app-chain fork risk (Berachain pattern)
references/perpetual-dex.md §9 — Liquidity vault as liquidation absorber: Hyperliquid HLP structural manipulation, oracle centralization risk
references/tool-integration.md — Aderyn v0.6 rewrite (LSP, CI, 100+ detectors), Echidna 2025 verification mode + Foundry reproducer, Halmos + Recon auto-reproducer
references/audit-questions.md — AI-assisted exploit development considerations (Balancer V2 console.log evidence)
references/industry-standards.md — Solidity deprecation timeline (transfer/send/ABI v1 → removed in 0.9.0), Glamsterdam upgrade (ePBS, BALs)

New in v3.2.0

references/vulnerability-taxonomy.md §19.6 — TSTORE Poison compiler bug (solc 0.8.28–0.8.33 + --via-ir): ownership theft, reentrancy guard bypass, ~500K affected contracts
references/vulnerability-taxonomy.md §19.7 — 2300-gas stipend bypass via TSTORE: transfer()/send() no longer block reentrancy when callee uses TSTORE
references/vulnerability-taxonomy.md §22 — EVM EOF (EIP-7692/Fusaka): gas/code observability removal, EXTDELEGATECALL legacy restriction, deploy-time validation
references/vulnerability-taxonomy.md §3.4 — Math overflow sentinel errors: Cetus $223M pattern, wrong bit-shift boundaries in FullMath/PRBMath
references/vulnerability-taxonomy.md §6.6 — OZ v4→v5 storage slot migration break: sequential vs ERC-7201 namespaced layout
references/vulnerability-taxonomy.md §12.6 — Phantom collateral via failed external call: Abracadabra pattern, cook() batch-router shared-state
references/vulnerability-taxonomy.md §4.5 — ERC-7726 false validity assumption: oracle adapters that silently pass invalid data
references/vulnerability-taxonomy.md §18.6 — V4 hook LDF rounding attack: Bunni $8.4M, asymmetric rounding in add/remove liquidity
references/defi-checklist.md — JIT liquidity attack checklist, LDF rounding checklist, Modular Lending (Morpho Blue + Euler V2 EVC) checklist
references/account-abstraction.md — EIP-7701 Native AA section: ACCEPT_ROLE opcode risk, legacy contract unintentional validation
references/automated-detection.md — TSTORE Poison version detector + co-usage regex patterns

Navigation

references/INDEX.md — Topic → file:section map; use when you know the topic but not which file covers it

Load these files as needed based on the specific audit context.

Important Notes

Always state clearly if the review is a limited automated scan vs. a full manual audit
Never guarantee that code is "100% secure" — audits reduce risk, they don't eliminate it
Flag centralization risks even if they aren't traditional "vulnerabilities"
Consider the economic incentives: would the exploit be profitable given gas costs?
Check interactions with common DeFi primitives (flash loans, MEV, composability)
When in doubt about severity, read how Sherlock, Code4rena, and Immunefi classify similar findings

solidity-security-audit