gemini-review
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 6, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (Category 8). It reads code changes using
git diffand interpolates them directly into the LLM prompt inSKILL.md(Step 4). - Ingestion points: The output of
git diff(staged, uncommitted, or branch-based) is passed to the AI. - Boundary markers: Uses markdown code blocks (triple backticks) to delimit the diff, which can be bypassed by malicious content within the diff itself.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses
mcp__acp__Bashto execute thegeminiCLI with the--yoloflag. - Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering is performed on the diff content before it is sent to the LLM.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The execution flow in
SKILL.mduses thegeminiCLI with the--yoloflag. This flag is typically used in LLM-powered command-line tools to allow the model to execute suggested actions or fixes without explicit user confirmation. When combined with the indirect prompt injection surface mentioned above, this creates a risk of remote code execution if a malicious diff tricks the model into outputting a destructive command. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation refers to
https://github.com/google-gemini/gemini-clifor installation. This is an official repository from a well-known organization (Google) and is documented here as a trusted reference.
Audit Metadata