second-opinion
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 29, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The execution flow in
SKILL.mduses an unquoted HEREDOC (<<EOF) to pass data to thegeminiCLI tool. In bash, unquoted HEREDOCs perform variable expansion and command substitution on the content. Since the$CONTEXTvariable contains the raw content of project files, any file containing shell execution patterns such as$(...)or backticks will have those commands executed locally when the skill is run. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references the
gemini-clitool and provides installation instructions pointing to thegoogle-geminiGitHub organization, which is a trusted source for developer tools. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted data from the local filesystem to build its prompt.
- Ingestion points: Full content of project files is gathered in Step 2 of the
Execution Flow. - Boundary markers: The skill uses markdown headers (e.g.,
## Problem Context) as delimiters, which can be easily bypassed or confused by malicious content within the analyzed files. - Capability inventory: The skill executes shell commands (
gemini) and reads local files, providing a high-impact target for successful injection. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, escaping, or filtering of the file contents before they are interpolated into the shell command or the LLM prompt.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata