lightpanda-browser
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 12, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill documentation recommends installing the Lightpanda engine by piping a shell script from an unverified GitHub repository (
nichochar/install-lightpanda) directly into bash viacurl -fsSL ... | bash. This practice poses a significant risk as it allows for the execution of arbitrary, unvetted code from a third-party source. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The setup instructions facilitate privilege escalation and persistence by detailing how to create system-level services on macOS (
LaunchAgents) and Linux (systemd). The Linux instructions specifically requiresudoprivileges to write to protected directories and reload system configurations, which can be abused to maintain long-term access to the host environment. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary function—headless browser automation—exposes an indirect prompt injection surface when processing external web content.
- Ingestion points: External data is ingested via
agent-browser --cdp 9222 open <url>and extraction commands likeget textorsnapshotinSKILL.mdand several template scripts. - Boundary markers: No delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present in the skill's prompts to protect the agent from malicious website content.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities, including the ability to execute shell commands and manage background processes.
- Sanitization: No validation or sanitization of content extracted from web pages is performed before being introduced to the agent's context.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://github.com/nichochar/install-lightpanda/raw/main/install.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata